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Abstract: In light of the recent protests against police brutality, we have witnessed overall
patterns of dissatisfaction in public opinion with the current state of policing, exacerbated by an
inability to produce widespread and substantial police reform. This perplexing issue is the result
of increased reliance on top-down regulation, which relies upon the assumption that the users of
police services do not directly contribute to the quality of the service produced. As a
consequence, there is a general lack of avenues for citizen participation, or bottom-up
governance, to effectively channel public opinion towards creating substantive changes within
police departments. Constructing a dataset and two variables, bottom-up governance and
satisfaction, I run OLS regressions to test whether an increase in bottom-up governance leads to
increased citizen satisfaction with the local police department. I find that an increase in bottomup governance does in fact lead to higher levels of citizen satisfaction. These findings have
significant implications that extend far beyond policing and can be applied to the production of
all local public goods and services, not only public safety.
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Part I: Motivation
Police Brutality and a Lack of Police Reform in America
On May 25, 2020, George Floyd was murdered over a counterfeit $20 bill. Derek
Chauvin, a Minnesota police officer with previous complaints on use of excessive force, had
knelt on Floyd’s neck for 8 minutes and 46 seconds, according to a report filed by the Hennepin
County District Attorney, the last 2 minutes and 53 seconds of which Floyd was silent and
unresponsive (Hill et al., 2021).
The situation surrounding Floyd’s murder is not an anomaly in America. On July 17,
2014, Eric Garner died after being placed in a chokehold in police custody; he was arrested for
selling cigarettes illegally on the street. On August 9, 2014, eighteen-year-old Michael Brown
was shot dead by a white police officer, who claimed to have feared for his life during their
encounter, despite the fact that Brown was completely unarmed. On November 22, 2014,
following a complaint about a “male sitting on a swing and pointing a gun at people”, twelveyear-old Tamir Rice was shot dead by police in a city park while playing with a toy gun
(Sparrow, 2016:3-5). There are many other victims of related situations: Breonna Taylor,
Trayvon Martin, Walter Scott, and Freddie Carlos Gray Jr. to name a few. Even though such
blatantly unjustifiable incidents have repeatedly taken place and have received widespread media
shame, adequate changes on how policing is conducted today have not been made. Essentially,
police performance remains sub-par, to say the least, despite clear public desire to improve the
priorities of and strategies employed by the police.
The sheer injustice seen in Floyd’s murder, building off of the countless instances of
police brutality that black Americans have been, and currently are, subject to, triggered a mass
mobilization of protestors immediately following Floyd’s death all across America and the
5

globe. The protests demanded police accountability over police brutality, as well as called for
widespread societal changes on the structure of policing itself and its relationship with systemic
racism. In light of this wave of activism, there have been varying efforts made to address the
situation. On one side, offending officers in Louisville, KY have been placed on administrative
leave, and on the other side, Minneapolis has even announced completely dismantling the local
police force in favor of other systems of providing for public safety. Somewhere in the middle,
New York City’s mayor has announced a transfer of funding from the city’s police department
towards youth and social services, and chokeholds have been banned in a number of cities
(Baker, 2020; Herndon, 2021; Rubinstein, 2020). What is noticeably neglected from the
discourse on police reform is the idea of creating an institutional framework that will allow for
continued, long term citizen participation in determining what the police’s priorities should be.
This goes beyond creating surface level, politically motivated changes that only aim to placate
agitated protestors during waves of intense activism.
Insufficient Pathways towards Reform
The answer to why adequate reform in policing has not yet taken place, despite clear
public pressure, is top-down regulation. This method of governance has become increasingly
normalized in the U.S. over the past few decades. As the federal and state governments make
more and more decisions on behalf of the community, the resulting lack of local involvement
has led to an environment where people do not feel invested in their communities, as policies
and regulations do not truly reflect the desires of the people. This creates space for outside
actors to insert their policy preferences into policing, falling into a negative feedback loop
where government seems to represent the desires of the people less and less. This move
towards mass consolidation and top-down forcing over community-based management is an
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important current domestic process to consider when thinking about social controls and the
militarization of the police, as it has dire implications on the democratic nature of our society.
If decisions continue to be made on a statewide or national scale, there is no need for citizens
to actively engage and participate in local self-governance, or “bottom-up” governance”.
This larger pattern of top-down regulation explains why those who directly receive the
service of public safety, and have the most at stake in the quality of the service provided, do not
seem to be more involved in the process of policy formation and decision making. Simply stated,
citizens cannot participate in bottom-up governance because important decisions have now been
left to the “top” to make, and they have become increasingly accustomed to having no ability, or
desire, to participate in their own governance.
Over/Under-policing and the Importance of Local Public Opinion
Starkly opposing this general pattern of apathy that typically characterizes American
politics, Floyd’s murder has temporarily erased this pattern within the field of police reform,
although the permanence of such increased levels of mobilization and activism is questionable.
Nevertheless, as a result of his death, there has been much debate on determining the path
towards police reform. Along with many other ideas, the concept of “defunding the police” has
been thrown around with increased frequency as of late. In a survey conducted on June 16-22,
2020, the Pew Research Center found that a decreasing number of Americans gave police forces
positive ratings on their use of force, treatment of different racial groups, and level of
accountability for individual officers’ actions. However, only a quarter of Americans actually
believe in decreased spending on the police. Instead, there seems to be broad support for training
officers in nonviolent alternatives to deadly force and increasing individual officers’
accountability for their actions, while keeping overall spending levels constant. They also found

7

that 74% of Americans support requiring officers to live in the places they police, which
advances the idea that officers will most effectively protect and police those they have an
inherent connection with (Pew Research Center, 2020).
While there is indisputable merit in looking at national trends of public opinion, and these
survey results do provide valuable information about the state of public opinion on policing in
the US, there is a dangerous likelihood of oversimplification that occurs when aggregating at a
national level. Communities across the US are not identical, and aggregating survey results to
determine the “average” American opinion will likely lead to the erasure of incorporating
heterogeneous beliefs into the policing system, as the nuances of local communities and their
specific desires for their police department are overlooked in favor of a broader, national
perspective.
Taking a closer look at policing opinion in the US, it is revealed that certain areas report
feeling over-policed, while others feel under-policed (Brunson, 2020). These varying opinions on
current levels of police spending highlight a larger pattern: that support for increased police
presence varies community to community, unlike what a national concatenation of opinion
suggests. I identify this as a weakness in the current literature, as community preferences are
more accurately characterized when they are geographically stratified, yet there is still
disproportionately substantial emphasis on national trends in opinion on policing.
Even within Minneapolis, where George Floyd was murdered by a member of the local
police department, citizens hold a diverse range of opinions on what policing should look like in
the community. Liberal members of the Minneapolis City Council supported calls for replacing
the police department with “a department of community safety and violence prevention”
(Friedman, 2020). On the other end of the spectrum, there is a coalition of community leaders in
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Minneapolis who oppose these changes, afraid of the recent surge in gang shootings, lootings,
and drug dealing that have filled their neighborhoods in North Minneapolis. They want “both a
better police force and enough officers to protect their kids and their streets – not either the
present unreformed police or a disbanded police department and an uncertain replacement”
(Friedman, 2020). This example of such nuanced opinion on the actions and priorities of a local
police department leads me to two conclusions:
1. Aggregating public opinion at greater levels of geographic scale will lead to further
erasure of specific, experienced information that only the local community has, when
there is already difficulty in accommodating the heterogeneous opinions that occur at the
local level.
2. Perceptions of both over and under policing are consequences of an unresponsive police
department that is unable to adjust to and satisfy the community’s needs. People are
currently voicing their opinions on how policing should be conducted today, but there
often aren’t adequate, productive avenues for channeling these opinions into real,
substantive changes.
With the ideas of bottom-up governance, self-governing, and democracy in mind, what
would increased citizen participation in setting their local police department’s agenda look like,
and just how significantly would it improve community satisfaction with policing? Since there is
already significant heterogeneity in opinion at a local level, shouldn’t decision-making be left at
the smallest possible order of governance?
This thesis investigates these questions. Using community surveys on satisfaction with
the local police department, I quantitatively model the relationship between bottom-up
governance and satisfaction with local policing. To measure police performance, I work off of
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Elinor Ostrom’s rationale and justification for utilizing satisfaction as an accurate measure for
performance, over other traditional measures and statistics. My model for Bottom-Up
Governance is also based on Elinor Ostrom’s groundbreaking work on the co-production of
public goods and services, where an increase in citizen participation in setting the priorities of
the police department will lead to increased satisfaction with the performance of the
department.
Ultimately, I find that localities with higher levels of bottom-up governance achieve
higher levels of citizen satisfaction with the local police department. This finding confirms
my hypothesis that citizen participation and the ability to conduct self-governance are key
factors in producing high quality public goods and services. Namely, the institutions that
allow for bottom-up governance are essential in channeling active citizen engagement towards
the production of substantive change.
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Part II: Literature Review
Polycentricity and Self-Governance
I begin with a discussion of polycentricity in order to illuminate why the creation of
quality police services requires a polycentric system of governance that can accommodate a
diverse range of communities and opinions, as opposed to a top-down, centralized form of
governance.
Polycentricity refers to an institutional arrangement where there are multiple, semiautonomous decision-making centers that act independently, but are constrained by a set of
norms and rules that create conditions where a “bottom-up, competitive process” can naturally
occur (Aligica et al., 2019: 124). Under a polycentric system, a community will choose to
address some common problems directly, but they may decide that other issues are best dealt
with under larger orders of governance (McGinnis, 1999:3). Under a federalist system, these
orders of governance would consist of “neatly nested jurisdictions at the local, state or
provincial, and national levels” (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011; Carlisle and Gruby, 2017). This is
distinct from polycentricity, which also includes “crosscutting jurisdictions specializing in
particular policy matters… private corporations, voluntary associations, and community-based
organizations”, despite the fact that these entities have no officially designated public role in
governance (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011). Polycentricity allows for a unique combination of
centralized and fully decentralized or community-based management to govern any given
community, solely based on their specific needs and desires (Carlisle and Gruby, 2017; Imperial,
1999). Moreover, political economist Vincent Ostrom explains how
a successful self-governing system provides its members the greatest possible opportunity
for living under rules of their own choice, hence leading to complex federalist structures,
11

while at the same time preserving a broad shared community of understanding such that
political stability is not undermined. In other words, a successful self-governing system is
polycentric (1997).
There is no single, optimal set of rules that will adequately meet the needs and desires of all the
heterogeneous, diverse communities in the US. Even at a local level, it is still fairly difficult to
reach an agreement; this can be seen through the widely varying opinions on police reform
within the city of Minneapolis, introduced earlier in my motivation. To accommodate for this
heterogeneity, instead of a single set of policy prescriptions, “we need to think about the
institutional arrangements that facilitate a peaceful and inclusive negotiation process between
parties with different values and visions” (Aligica et al., 2019: 127-8). This framework requires a
much smaller scale of governance and scope for rulemaking in dealing with matters of public
administration, including public safety. Under this theory, adequate pathways for community
involvement in rulemaking will allow for a unique set of rules to be determined that fit the needs
and desires of the local community. This locally determined set of rules will be independent of
any rules developed in other neighboring communities, so long as they are governed under
minimal national requirements, where “political stability is not undermined” (V. Ostrom, 1997).
Coming from this background of polycentric orders of governance, Elinor Ostrom
contends that polycentric systems are more elastic and able to respond to fulfilling the specific
policy preferences of the local community (Boettke et al., 2013). She developed this argument
for community-based management in response to the consolidationist assertions of the 1960s.
Supporters of mass consolidation argued about its “technical efficiency in the production of local
public goods”, claiming that polycentrism was inefficient and wasteful (Boettke et al., 2013). In
the realm of public safety, they asserted that specialization and professionalization were
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necessary requisites for effective law enforcement, and that consolidated, larger-scale police
departments were more efficient than smaller departments at attaining these standards (Ostrom
and Whitaker, 1973). Countering such unsubstantiated notions, V. Ostrom also argued that
consolidated and centralized governance would, in fact, be “insensitive and clumsy in meeting
the demands of the local citizens” (Ostrom et al. 1961:837). They placed particular emphasis on
the need for active citizen participation in voicing the demands of the community, in harmony
with her Tocquevillian manner of thinking and my hypothesis on bottom-up governance.
Ostrom’s framework for community-based management is founded upon the creation of
citizens who are capable of democratic self-governance. Her work not only found that a
polycentric system can effectively respond to the needs of diverse local communities, but that the
local public goods produced by citizens in these systems of community-based management could
be just as effective as consolidated government units (Boettke et al., 2013). Only within this
framework of polycentricity, where the ability to independently and elastically respond to the
desires of the local community exists, can a true realization of bottom-up governance come into
fruition.
Co-production and Bottom-Up Governance
Keeping this idea of polycentricity in mind, my hypothesis on bottom-up governance is
also strongly grounded within the concept of co-production, first established by Elinor and
Vincent Ostrom in the 1980s. Until the 1980s, the dominant public administration strategy relied
on the separation between politics and administration, where “control [was] hierarchical and
bureaucratic, based upon rules, formal procedures and norms that legitimize and regulate
administrative action” (Sorrentino et al., 2018; Weber, 1968; Wilson, 1887). Under this strategy,
the government directly provides services to a “passive” public, where there is little active
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participation on the citizen’s part and there is a clear, hierarchical order to decision making.
Here, it is assumed that the consumers of the services government provides – namely, the
citizens – do not directly contribute to the quality of the good that is produced (McGinnis,
1999:7). As the citizens have no say in determining the quality of the good provided by the
government, this implies that their input is unnecessary information that should not alter the
manner in which public goods and services are provided by the government.
The concept of co-production fully pushes back on this traditional idea with the belief
that “the [effective] production and delivery of services is difficult without the active
participation of the recipients” (Ostrom, 1996:1079). Citizens are not the passive targets of
government activities but are “vital elements in their success or failure”, in such services as
education, health, waste management, and public safety. Here, citizen involvement is not
superfluous, but it is an essential component of effective service production (Sorrentino et al.,
2018; Brudney and England, 1983; Parks et al., 1981; Sharp, 1980). Co-production creates
hybrid institutions that involve a mixed set of arrangements with government and citizens
working together (Aligica et al., 2019:122). Whitaker (1980) defines coproduction as “the active
involvement of the general public and, especially, those who are to be the direct beneficiaries of
the service”. Sharp (1980) takes a similar position: “the coproduction concept is based upon the
recognition that public services are the joint product of the activities of both citizens and
government officials.” Overall, there is a consensus that co-production is a fundamental
contradiction to traditional, hierarchical strategies of public administration, where decision
making and authority arises from the bottom up, as opposed to the top down.
The connection between the concepts of co-production and democracy is quite clear.
Participation is a crucial aspect in the co-production of public services, as the government cannot
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effectively provide services that accurately cater to the needs of the local community without
active citizen participation (Whitaker, 1980; McGinnis, 1999:22). With this understanding of coproduction and its relationship to polycentricity, the idea of bottom-up governance in policing
fits in quite seamlessly. Essentially, a “high quality” police department can look completely
different in two towns and have completely different sets of priorities. The specific rules that are
produced by each town are not important, but the process of rule production is what matters in
the creation of a “high quality” police department. I prefer to use the term bottom-up
governance, as it insinuates a heavier focus on citizen input from the “bottom up”, instead of the
joint interaction between the government and citizenry as two distinct but cooperative entities
that “co-production” implies. In a self-governing, bottom-up system, citizen input is the key
component of the rule-creation process, as the rules that are produced must satisfy the
preferences of those who are subject to them (Aligica et al. 2019:128).
Because of the importance of citizen input in the creation of locally satisfactory rules, and
since we have established that there is no single, optimal set of rules that will adequately meet
the needs and desires of all the heterogeneous, diverse communities in the US, it is important to
ask “what the institutional arrangements are that make it possible for people with different
values to peacefully coexist and self-govern” (Aligica et al. 2019: 124). In understanding that the
goal of co-production is not to simply aggregate disparate beliefs into a “single coherent
system”, but instead to determine the best way for heterogeneous, diverse values to coexist, it is
clear why the Ostroms identify polycentricity as the one solution for dealing with this challenge,
and how the concept of self-governance is so closely intertwined to co-production (Aligica et al.
2019: 124). Moreover, the necessity of bottom-up governance in creating a resilient system of
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policing that caters to the unique, ever-fluctuating desires of a local community cannot be
understated.
Traditional Measures of Police Performance
If we are to take polycentricity and bottom-up governance as prerequisites of democratic
self-governance, then our measures for understanding what government does must also be
sufficiently democratic. That is, these measures have to be capable of incorporating the widely
varying, heterogenous opinions of the people, and they must be able to signal whether the
government is acting in harmony with the local citizenry’s beliefs, or if the government is
working against them. Thus, there is an extensively studied rationale for the use of public
opinion to measure satisfaction with local policing, as opposed to other methods of
measurement.
Traditional measures of police performance have largely drawn conclusions from crime
statistics and other conventionally measured activities (Gorby, 2013). Easily measured empirical
outputs make performance seemingly straightforward, allowing for a simple determination of
steps to fix whatever inadequacy in performance that might exist (Gorby, 2013). This includes
rates of reported crime, number of traffic citations, crimes solved, response time, and arrests
made (Ostrom and Whitaker, 1973). However, these traditional measures, such as the FBI Crime
Index, have been firmly established as a poor indicator of performance, despite their continued
use and existence (Ostrom and Whitaker, 1973). The inaccuracies found in using such measures
are overlooked in favor of the belief that policing should be apolitical, relying on a specific set of
nationally determined measures, instead of catering to the needs and desires of the community
itself. These general measures also only focus on a small aspect of modern policing, as research
has shown that only 10-20% of police work involves “traditional police work” (White, 2008).
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Therefore, it is clear that utilizing general statistics as a proxy for police performance does not
provide an accurate assessment of the police department’s true efficacy (Fielding and Innes,
2007).
There are a number of other problematic issues that further delegitimize the use of these
traditional measures of police performance. First and foremost, most crime goes unreported; the
National Crime Victimization Survey reported that only 39% of all crime in the US is reported to
the police, so these crime-based indices are working off of incomplete, inaccurate data (White,
2009). Additionally, focusing on rates of arrests and number of traffic citations given often does
not line up with the community’s definition of public safety; in fact, a perceived excess of traffic
citations has been found to reduce public confidence in the police (Ren et al., 2004).
Departments that focus on these measures tend to have lower perceptions of credibility and
legitimacy, along with poor community relations (Gorby, 2013; Ren et al., 2004; White, 2008;
Sanders, 2010). Qualitative studies of police performance have also found that high arrest rates
and high citation rates were signs of poor performance, which fully contradicts the rationale
behind using these measures to estimate performance (Sanders, 2010). Moreover, some police
officials “place special emphasis on improving performance as measured by such indicators”, so
these measures may be artificially inflated to have the appearance of higher performance than
reality (Ostrom and Whitaker, 1973). This “distortion” of performance in specific, evaluated
measures is not an uncommon pattern in many bureaucracies, and continued reliance on such
measures will only increase the incentive for police departments to place disproportionate
emphasis on improving performance by these measures (Cahill, 1976:7; Benson, 1981).
To address these apparent failures in traditional measures of police performance, there
have also been some attempts to use the individual performance of police officers as a possible
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alternative metric. Gorby (2013) discusses performance-based management evaluations, where
the performance of each police officers is regularly assessed. The focus on individual officers
does have merit, as it can weed out under-performing individuals who do not meet the
department’s standard. The metric itself that is used to determine the performance of each
individual must be accurately constructed, as the argument for “performance-based”
management raises the question on what “performance” itself entails. It could potentially amount
to the single evaluation by the police chief or department official, but there are inherent biases
involved in this type of evaluation, as police chiefs are sometimes politically motivated (by a
connection with the town’s mayor) and have a personal set of preferences on how the department
should be run. I argue that the perception of a police department’s performance as a whole is an
equally valid and important measure to evaluate, as it simultaneously takes into consideration the
performance of individuals, while also broadly questioning whether the overall police
department is meeting the expectations of the community.
In another attempt to address the failures of traditional measures of police performance,
Moore and Braga (2003) offer a framework for police performance measurement that focuses on
a specific set of services provided by the police. They look at the enforcement of the law, feeling
of safety, and quality of “customer service” that the police gives as incorporated in the value of
“performance”. These categories amount in a scorecard that assumes equal value to each
category. For example, under the general category of safety, reducing crime and victimization,
increasing traffic safety, reducing public disorder, providing emergency medical/social services,
and increasing efficiency/cost effectiveness all hold the same weight. The inherent problem with
assigning equal values to each factor in “safety” is that it assumes the priorities of the
community, so the resulting outcome of “performance”, which is a subjective measure itself, is
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based on a set of pre-determined factors that may or may not be what the community considers
in their perception of the police.
Commonly deemed to be an unavoidable problem in the research of police performance,
“data relies on what people believe”, so certain measures of crime may be inversely related to the
perception of police performance (Waddington et al., 2017:4). This may seem to undermine the
reliability of using surveys to measure police performance, but a number of studies have argued
that perception of performance is just as important a measure as traditionally used rates and
statistics (Gorby, 2013; Fielding and Innes, 2006; Skolnick and Fife, 1993). For my argument, I
believe that perception is more accurate than these traditional measures of police performance,
which have already been shown to be a largely inaccurate picture of what modern policing
entails, and potentially are inflated for the appearance of increased performance (Ostrom and
Whitaker, 1973; White, 2008; Fielding and Innes, 2007; White, 2009; Sanders, 2010). Further
justifying the use of perception as a valid measure of police performance, public perceptions of
the fairness, respect and legitimacy of what police officers do in encounters has a strong impact
on their “compliance and cooperation” with officers (Vila et al., 2016; Mazerolle et al., 2013).
Understandably, individuals care just as much about how they are treated by the police than
about changes in crime rates (Vila et al., 2016; Tyler and Huo., 2002; Tyler et al., 2015).
Ostrom’s Measure of Satisfaction
Ostrom uses locally self-determined criteria in her studies on public safety. Her
framework of community-based management lends itself to the idea that conceptions of public
safety vary community to community, so the most accurate method to determine police
performance is by asking the individuals themselves who are benefitting from the services
provided by the police and who are directly interacting with members of the department. This
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use of citizen satisfaction as a measure of police performance has long been supported by many
others (Cahill, 1976; Brown and Coulter, 1983; Gill et al. 2017; Hinds, 2008). Tyler (1990)
found that public satisfaction with police is significantly linked to “people’s willingness to report
crime and suspicious events, obey police decisions and rules, and comply with the law more
generally” (Hinds, 2008). Measuring community satisfaction also goes beyond performancebased management, as suggested by Gorby (2013). The cumulative perception of the police
department as a whole encompasses the perception of individual actors, therefore acting as a
more comprehensive measure of performance than on an individual basis.
Ostrom found that small police departments with a high degree of community
involvement were able to leverage important personal knowledge and local ties to improve
community satisfaction with police (Boettke et al., 2013). This challenged the popular belief that
consolidation and centralization of services is the only way to effectively provide citizens with
public goods. She measured police output by respondents’ experience with the police, as well as
citizen evaluations of service levels. Speaking to this idea of bottom-up governance, many of the
officers in very big departments do not see themselves as responsible to the citizens. They are on
duty for very specific hours and with an entirely different mentality, where the input and
priorities of the community are rarely considered (Ibid).
In looking at police performance, Ostrom also argued that smaller police forces under
community control are not necessarily less effective at meeting citizen’s demands than larger,
city-wide consolidated police departments (Ostrom and Whitaker, 1973). She determined that
smaller police forces are more likely to have officers that live in the community, are more aware
of local needs, and are more likely to have existing relationships with members of the
community. This existing relationship between the community and the police allows for officers
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to act with more knowledge on the situation, as opposed to officers from rotating precincts that
have no investment in the wellbeing of the community in and of itself, instead focusing on the
job and the specific tasks it entails. As an interesting note, despite an established literature on the
merits of surveys and the use of satisfaction to evaluate police performance, traditional measures
of crime rates continue to be widely used. This finding emphasizes the institutionalized nature of
current policing methods and practices, as well as the relative stiffness that characterizes our
current system of governance.
Factors Associated with Police Performance and Bottom-up Governance
Now that I have established the validity of using satisfaction to measure the quality of a
local police department’s performance, I look into a number of known factors that have a known
effect on satisfaction. In determining these confounding variables, I will be able to take them into
consideration and control for them in my quantitative model testing the relationship between
bottom-up governance and satisfaction.
There is a well-established school of literature looking into the factors that affect
legitimacy, confidence, support, and satisfaction with the police (and similar descriptors that all
essentially refer to police performance). Demographic variables have received particularly high
levels of attention, and there are a number of significant findings with these variables,
considering them both individually and collectively. Undermining an equitable perception of
public safety, variables like age, race/ethnicity, and socio-economic status are strongly associated
with confidence in the police (Brown and Coulter, 1983). Moreover, these demographics
variables seem to inform how individuals feel they are welcome and able to participate in
bottom-up governance.
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Race
I begin by highlighting general trends in the relationship between race, satisfaction with
the police, and likelihood of political participation in hopes to clarify the connection between an
individual’s racial identity and capacity for bottom-up governance. People of color, black people
in particular, are significantly less satisfied with police performance than white people
(Waddington et al. 2017:3; Weitzer and Tuch 2005a:288; Weitzer and Tuch 1999;2005b). This
may be linked to the fact that the quality of police-citizen encounters is significantly associated
with police satisfaction (Hinds, 2008), and victimization experiences tend to increase negative
attitudes toward the police (Cao et al., 1996; Apple and O’Brien, 1983; Homant et al., 1984;
Koenig, 1980; Parks, 1984; Smith and Hawkins, 1973). There are many nuances to satisfaction
in policing, as two groups of people who are both exposed to the same level of crime and
disorder in the community, but are subject to different levels of aggressive enforcement, will
have significantly different ratings of the police (Weitzer and Tuch 2006; 2004). Surveys have
consistently revealed that black Americans believe they receive inferior police protection and
disproportionately suffer from police abuse, so a decrease in satisfaction with the police
highlights the low-quality nature of black Americans’ encounters with the police (Ostrom and
Whitaker, 1974; McGinnis, 1999:203). Overall, younger, male, and poorer racial/ethnic
minorities living in urban environments are more likely to be involved in a police stop and some
type of use-of-force incident (Boylstein, 2018). This can partially be attributed to the fact that
police have a great deal of discretion in determining how to handle problems on the job; Black
(1971) found that the police made arrests on only half the occasions they had legal grounds to
(Weitzer and Tuch, 2006:3).
As black Americans and people of color are disproportionately targeted by the police and
have overall lower quality interactions with the police, this rationalizes their lower satisfaction in
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police performance and their fundamental inability to have similar experiences/satisfaction levels
as white people in America (Weitzer and Tuch, 2006). Coupled with the low-quality nature of
police encounters, these feelings of alienation discourage partnership with the police and their
involvement in bottom-up governance at a local level. Further intensifying the issue of
dissatisfaction and low participation, this leads to a negative reinforcement feedback loop, where
black people and POC are continually disappointed by police performance, as they lack the
ability and/or desire to participate in dictating the rules of an agency they feel both alienated
from and antagonized by.
Socio-economic Status
I move on to discuss the relationship between socio-economic status and police
satisfaction, in order to illuminate the barriers towards participating in bottom-up governance
that lower income individuals face. First and foremost, it is important to note that there is a
strong relationship between race and socio-economic status in America, as we see people of
color disproportionately occupy lower social strata (Waddington et al., 2017:7). Moreover,
socio-economic status has an established relationship with public attitudes on the police, where
lower support is associated with lower socio-economic status (Waddington et al. 2017:7; Bayley
and Mendelsohn 1969; Belson 1975; Brown and Benedict 2002; Schuck et al. 2008; Weitzer and
Tuch 1999; 2002; 2005a; Taylor et al. 2010; Frank et al. 2005; Wu et al. 2009). Evidently, race
and class have a complex, intersectional relationship, and although they seem to confound each
other, both are equally valid and important characteristics to consider when measuring
perceptions of police performance. There is also evidence that increased socio-economic status is
associated with increases political participation (Verba and Nie, 1972; Scott and Acock, 1979).
Regarding satisfaction with the police, people of lower socioeconomic status will be less likely
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to participate in bottom-up governance for the co-production of public safety, as they face more
barriers towards participation, including higher opportunity costs of lost wages. Therefore, these
individuals will be less satisfied with the local police department’s performance, as they are
unlikely to insert their opinions in shaping the department’s strategies, rules, and priorities.
Additionally, as people of color disproportionately occupy lower social strata and maintain lower
levels of political participation, the relationship holds that these marginalized individuals will
have participate in lower levels of bottom-up governance than their white, wealthy counterparts.
Age
Next, I look at the relationship between age, police satisfaction, and likelihood of
political participation, in order to clarify the relationship between an individual’s age and
likelihood of participating in bottom-up governance. In a review of the existing American
literature, Brown and Bennet found that younger individuals tend to view the police less
favorably than older individuals (Waddington et al., 2017:8; Brown and Benedict 2002:554).
There is some disagreement on this finding, as Stewart et al. determined that people stay fairly
consistent in their beliefs, where those with high support as a youth maintain similar views as
they age, and vice versa (2014; Waddington et al., 2017:8). When examined together, age and
race have more readily revealed an association with attitude towards the police, as younger
people of color hold more negative views than older white individuals (Waddington et al.
2017:8; Decker 1981; Bridenball and Jesilow 2008; Reisig and Parks 2002; Ren et al. 2004).
More importantly, age has been found to be strongly associated with political
participation (Goldstein and Morin, 2002; Gimpel et al., 2004), so I predict that those who are
older will likely be more satisfied with the performance of their local police department, as they
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will be more inclined to participate in shaping the supposed needs of their community, if those
avenues of participation do, in fact, exist.
Gender
Lastly, I look at the relationship between gender, police satisfaction, and levels of
political participation, in hopes to illuminate the relationship between gender and an individual’s
likelihood of participating in bottom-up governance Although there is a general belief that men
hold less favorable views towards the police than women, the statistical significance of gender is
unclear (Waddington et al., 2017:8; Brown and Benedict, 2002). A number of studies were
unable to find any gender differences (Reisig and Parks, 2002; Decker, 1981), while in some
cases, women were actually found to have less favorable views of the police than men
(Waddington et al., 2017:9; Brown and Coulter, 1983). The influence of gender is most visible
when combined with the factors of age, race, and ‘community context’ (Cao et al. 1996) so that
most unfavorable attitudes against the police are held by young black men living in
disadvantaged conditions, while the most favorable attitudes are held by older white middle class
women (Waddington et al. 2017:9; Lasley 1994; Weitzer et al. 2008).
Women have also been found to have consistently lower levels of political participation
than men (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Beauregard 2014). This has negative implications for their
ability to participate in bottom-governance and to achieve similar levels of satisfaction as their
male counterparts, who are more likely to insert their opinions and preferences on how the police
department should be run. This means that women are more likely to experience lower levels of
satisfaction, as they are less likely to participate in local bottom-up governance affect change in
their local police department.
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It is quite evident that there has been a remarkable amount of research done on
demographic variables and individual characteristics that are associated with police
satisfaction. My attention on bottom-up governance shifts away from this individualistic lens
in hopes of clarifying the underlying mechanism that is associated with a citizen’s ability to
input their beliefs in the agenda-setting process of a local police department (or any governing
structure, for that matter). The key factor that associates these demographic variables with
satisfaction is not the demographic variable itself, but the ability and likelihood of meaningful
political participation that accompanies each demographic identity. This leads me to propose
my main hypothesis in the next section.
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Part III: Methods
Bottom-Up Governance Hypothesis: Increased bottom-up governance in local policing will
lead to increased community satisfaction.
Testing the Hypothesis
Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with Police Performance
As previously stated, the decision to use satisfaction as the primary measure of police
performance originates from Elinor Ostrom’s metric of satisfaction and use of citizen surveys in
rating the quality of police services, but this method has also been widely used among others
within this school of literature (Gill et al., 2014; Dean, 1980; Ren et al., 2004; Hinds, 2008; Lytle
and Randa, 2015). The perception of performance by citizens matter, just as much as the
traditional crime rates and statistics police departments choose to define their performance
(Ostrom, 1976). The police office performs more roles than simply “crime fighter”, and the
outcome of the accumulation of their individual roles is seen through outsider perception on how
well they do their job (Gorby, 2013).
No compiled database on police satisfaction surveys currently exists, so I made multiple
web searches on Google’s search engine, using the words “police satisfaction survey” and other
similar terms, to track all potential surveys. Approximately 30 pages of results, or 300 possible
web links, were available for review, and every survey link was examined to determine if the
appropriate police satisfaction variable was measured in the survey. In total, 72 surveys were
found to be compatible with my requirements and were included in this study. The survey sizes
varied widely; the smallest survey was n=30 (Richmond Heights, MO), and the largest survey
was n=5064 (Seattle, WA), with a mean survey size of n=974.77 and a standard deviation of
954.42. Generally, the survey response rates were fairly low (relative to the total voting age
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population). The lowest response rate was 0.037%, and the highest was 5.5%, with a mean of
0.77% and a standard deviation of 0.97%. Given these low values, it is important to note that
these survey results may not be a completely accurate characterization of the opinions of the
entire community. However, there is no other available survey data asking these questions on
community satisfaction with the police, so these low values will simply act as a caveat in the
reliability of any findings determined from this study.
If multiple years of survey data were available for a police department, the data from the
most recent year was included for this study; 69 surveys were conducted within the last 5 years
(2016-2020), and 3 were conducted between 2012-2015 (Table 1). Using the Census Bureau’s
Region and Division codes to depict the geographic extent of the included surveys, the
breakdown indicates that all four regions are included, although region 3 is over-represented and
region 1 is under-represented (Table 2). All nine Census Bureau-designated divisions are also
included in this study, although these divisions are represented at varying frequencies (Table 3).
Table 1. Year in which the satisfaction survey was performed.
Year
Frequency
Percent (%)
2012
1
1.39
2013
1
1.39
2015
1
1.39
2016
6
8.33
2017
10
13.89
2018
15
20.83
2019
26
36.11
2020
12
16.67
Total
72
100
Table 2. Breakdown of regions included in the study, using Census Bureau region codes.
Region
Frequency
Percent (%)
1: Northeast
7
9.72
2: Midwest
18
25
3: South
32
44
4: West
15
20.83
Total
72
100
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Table 3. Breakdown of divisions included in the study, using Census Bureau division codes.
Division
Frequency
Percent (%)
1: New England
4
5.56
2: Middle Atlantic
3
4.17
3: East North Central
11
15.28
4: West North Central
7
9.72
5: South Atlantic
21
29.17
6: East South Central
2
2.78
7: West South Central
9
12.5
8: Mountain
7
9.72
9: Pacific
8
11.11
Total
72
100
In order to be included in this study, surveys were required to include a question asking
about the respondent’s level of satisfaction with their local police department. Terms that were
deemed equivalent to satisfaction with the police include police performance, quality of service
delivery, and police competence, although a majority of the surveys did specifically use the term
“satisfaction”. Common survey questions included the phrases: “rate your satisfaction with the
police department”, “rate the performance of the police”, “rate the quality of service delivery”,
and “rate the competence of the police department”. The majority of police surveys that were
included were targeted towards assessing citizen satisfaction at the town/city level, which works
very well with testing my hypothesis of bottom-up governance in community policing, as
opposed to surveys determining public opinion on the state police. However, three county-wide
satisfaction surveys were included in this study (Brown County, WI; Prince William County,
VA; Fairfax County, VA), as well as the District of Columbia. Consequently, I use the allencompassing term “localities” to refer to these levels of community organization in this paper.
Surveys were only included in this study if the satisfaction question referred to the
performance of the police department as a whole. Of the ~228 web links that were assessed but
ultimately not included, one fourth did not yield surveys with any satisfaction question; one
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fourth only inquired about respondent’s satisfaction with specific interactions with police
officers; one eighth yielded links to actual surveys, but I was unable to obtain their results after
emailing/reaching out to the locality’s government, either because they no longer had access to
the survey results, or I received no response; one eighth were survey results for state or foreign
police departments; and one eighth of the web links were not surveys or surveys results, but
police-related websites and research articles. The remaining eighth of evaluated, but ultimately
excluded, web links were surveys targeted only towards people who have had recent interactions
with the police, as these surveys only collected responses from an uncharacteristic sub-section of
the locality’s population (namely, those who have had recent, direct interactions with the police).
All surveys included in this study either had to be available for any citizen of the locality to
respond, or the surveyors had to have randomly sampled their locality for respondents.
It is important to note that the quality of these police satisfaction surveys widely varied.
A number of localities hired outside research firms to conduct methodologically-sound citizen
surveys, while others simply posted survey links on the police department’s website, making
news and social media posts to encourage individuals to fill out the survey; the majority of
surveys included in this study lie somewhere in between these two extremes. Additionally, in
most cases, the groups conducting the satisfaction surveys were the police departments
themselves, but in other cases, the surveyors were the locality’s government itself or hired,
external research organizations. I did not think it was appropriate to cherry pick data, simply
based on my perception of the quality of the survey, so I included all surveys that answered my
specific question in hopes of preventing any potential bias in this regard. I would expect that
excluding seemingly lower quality surveys would produce an upwards bias in satisfaction. This
is because higher quality satisfaction surveys may indicate a higher level of community
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investment in determining the opinions and values of the citizens. Essentially, these surveys
would qualify as higher quality of avenues for bottom-up governance.
Although there is no way to adjust for this bias, it is important to recognize that there is
likely an upward bias in the localities that carry out these satisfaction surveys. Conducting
citizen satisfaction surveys in itself is a form of bottom-up governance, as citizens are able to
signal to the police departments what their preferences and opinions on the department’s
performance is. More specifically, these satisfaction surveys are an avenue for citizen
participation and voicing their opinion. Therefore, police departments with perceivably low
performance are disincentivized from conducting these surveys, making this data publicly
available, and officially recognizing their poor performance.
I chose to record satisfaction on a 0-3 scale (a 4-point scale), as this was the most
commonly used scale in the surveys. These surveys would only give four possible answers to
choose from (0, 1, 2, 3) after asking the appropriate “police performance rating” question. A
score of 0 would mean the respondent was unsatisfied with police performance, 1 would indicate
not very satisfied, 2 would indicate somewhat satisfied, and 3 would indicate very satisfied.
Essentially, a lower score refers to lower satisfaction with police performance. The results to
these surveys would either provide an already calculated average satisfaction score for the
locality, or they would give the frequencies of each answer that respondents selected, and I
would calculate the average score myself.
When a 0-3 scale was not used in a particular survey, a weighted average calculator was
used to proportionately rescale the satisfaction values. With these recalculations, the lowest
possible value was kept constant at 0, the highest possible value was kept constant at 3, and any
intermediate values were kept at equal intervals to ensure consistency with the 4-point scale I
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have chosen for this analysis (0-3). For example, a 3-point scale with the possible answers of (0,
1, 2) was recalculated as (0, 1.5, 3) to fit within my chosen (0-3) scale. This means that the
lowest possible score of 0 would remain 0, the “average” score of 1 would become the “average”
score of 1.5, and the highest possible score of 2 would become the highest possible score of 3.
Note that the intervals between values in each scale remains equal. As another example, a 5point scale (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) was recalculated as (0, 0.75, 1.5, 2.25, 3), and so on. Again, the lowest
possible score of 0 remains 0, the “average” score of 2 becomes the “average” score of 1.5, and
the highest possible score of 4 would become the highest possible score of 3. These conversions
were relatively simple to make, as the magnitude of the scale does not change the fact that a
higher score means higher satisfaction.
Table 4. Overview of the dependent variable fitted on a 4-pt scale (0-3): respondent’s
satisfaction in the local police department.
Score
Frequency
Percent (%)
0-0.49
0
0
0.5-0.99
0
0
1-1.49
2
2.78
1.5-1.99
19
26.4
2-2.49
37
51.4
2.5-3
14
19.4
Total
72
100
Independent Variable: Bottom-Up Governance
As previously stated, my novel measure of bottom-up governance is based on Elinor
Ostrom’s model of co-production of public goods and services. This refers to how citizens and
government structures may work together to produce public goods; in this case, the good is
public safety. The dimensions of bottom-up governance that I have determined are: level of
dependence on internal funding, likelihood of citizen participation, avenues for citizen
participation, and ease of citizen participation (% internet access and % English speaking) (Table
5). To summarize my model:
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𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 𝑢𝑝 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
= 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
Table 5. Summary statistics of the independent variable: dimensions of bottom-up
governance in local community policing.
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev. Min
Max
Dependence on Internal Funding (%)
97.5
3.28
80.1
100
% Voting in Local Elections
26.5
17.5
5.90
86.6
Avenues of Citizen Participation
2.23
1.12
0
4
% Internet Access
86.3
6.38
66.3
97.7
% English Speaking
77.6
15.6
32.8
95.9
Note: n = 72
In the following sections, I will provide my rationale and justifications for including each of the
four dimensions in my model for Bottom-Up Governance.
Relative Dependence on Internal vs. External Funding
While studying the relationship between bottom-up governance and the police, Boettke et
al. (2016:3) found that federal policy over the last thirty years has subsidized local police
involvement in federally based anti-drug and anti-terrorism initiatives, “resulting in a set of
perverse incentives that has directed the efforts of local police agencies away from community
safety and toward a different set of objectives”. They argue that such federal incentives are
inherently incompatible with the objectives of community-based policing, where the goals and
priorities of the police are determined by the community from the bottom-up. Federal funding
can pull the local police department’s priorities away from what the community truly values and
instead towards federal initiatives. Extending on Boettke et al. (2016)’s argument from only
considering federal funding, I have chosen to include all external sources of funding in my
variable of external funding dependence, as I believe this outside monetary influence will direct
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local police efforts away from the community and towards an externally determined set of
policing priorities.
The level of external funding of local police departments in this study was determined
through a systematic review of each locality’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report or
Annual Budget Report. Preference was given to using the locality’s Annual Budget Report,
which was more likely to have the precise amounts and descriptions of grants acquired from
outside sources. In these annual budget reports, a monetary value for total dependence on
external funding was rarely given. Therefore, this value was calculated for each locality through
a careful, methodical summation of all external grants and aid projects listed in the annual
budget. The variable “external funding” includes federal and state categorical aid to local police
departments, as well as categorical aid from outside organizations to the police. Common
external sources of funding seen in the budget reports include the Edward Byrnes Justice
Assistance Grant (JAG), Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grants, and Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) federal grants. Other external sources of funding include High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area grants (HIDTA, a specific DEA grant), Safe Neighborhoods
grants, grants for mobile data computers, and asset forfeiture funds.
To ensure consistency, the police budget for the year of the police satisfaction survey was
recorded, not the most recently available budget. If a budget was not available for the year of the
survey, the closest available year was used instead. Additionally, in the rare instances that the
annual budget did not provide “actual values” (<5 cases), the listed “projected budget estimate”
values were used instead.
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Once the total monetary value of external funding was determined for each locality, the
level of external dependence was calculated by dividing the total external funding value by the
local police department’s total budget:
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 (%) =

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 ($)
∗ 100
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 ($)

Logically, internal funding dependence was calculated by subtracting the above noted value from
100:
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 (%) = 100 − 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 (%)
This re-calculation was done for ease of considering the effect of increasing bottom-up
governance on satisfaction. An increase in internal funding dependence will likely lead to more
satisfaction, as these police departments will be more amenable towards incorporating the
opinions of the citizens in their agenda, due to a relative lack of external funding influencing
their priorities.
Likelihood of Citizen Participation
Neatly coalescing with the concept of bottom-up governance, Sharp (1980) emphasizes
the participatory attitude that the term co-production conveys, as “citizens of a democratic
society… need to actively engage in their own governance” in order for the resulting priorities of
local public safety to truly reflect their own beliefs and opinions (McGinnis, 1999:22). Following
this line of reasoning, I used voter turnout at general mayoral elections as an indicator for
likelihood of citizen participation in bottom-up governance of policing, as localities with higher
voter participation will likely have more engaged citizens who will participate in local decision
making.
In 13 localities, including the three counties, mayoral election data was either unavailable
or did not exist. In cases where the locality did not have a mayor, the data for the next most
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contested local seat were collected instead: selectman, board supervisor, city/town council
member, or county board member. These were at-large offices and positions, where citizens of
the entire locality could vote, not only a specific ward or district. For the three counties included
in this study, each county was addressed differently given their unique political arrangements.
For Prince William County, election data was taken for their most contested position: chairman
of the board of supervisor’s seat. For Brown County, election data was collected for the most
contested county-wide position: county district attorney. For Fairfax County, the total number of
votes cast for mayors of each town within the county were added together. In one instance
(Burbank, CA), the mayor was appointed by the city council, so city council member election
data were used instead.
Similarly to the external funding measure, the election that took place in the year closest
to the survey was used. The primary sources of data on voter turnout were Ballotpedia and the
local government’s official website. However, in many of the smaller towns, data were
unavailable on these sites, so other sources were used to determine this information, primarily
the local newspapers. Once raw data on the number of ballots cast was collected, voter turnout
was calculated by dividing the total number of ballots cast by the locality’s voting age
population:
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡 (%) =

# 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡
∗ 100
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Data to determine the voting age population were collected from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s website. In order to ensure the most accurate voter turnout estimate for the time of the
survey and election, if the election took place between 2015-2020, the 2019 population estimate
was used, and if the election took place between 2010-2014, the 2010 population estimate was
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used. Voting age population was calculated by multiplying the locality’s total population size by
the proportion of the population over the age of 18 (0-1):
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 18 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠)
Avenues of Citizen Participation
Moore and Braga argue that the community should determine the police department’s
values, and these organizations should be able to adapt to how citizens define them (2003).
Although they do not explicitly use the term, it is clear that this philosophy closely aligns with
the concept of bottom-up governance. In order to effectively incorporate community values into
the values of the police, the local department “need[s] to see [its] role as creating circumstances
that encourage citizen participation and not just providing public services… [the department]
need[s] to nurture citizen’s capacity for self-governance…” (Sharp, 1980; McGinnis, 1999:22).
Following this line of reasoning, avenues of citizen participation in the local police department
were included in the measure of bottom-up governance to estimate the relative ease by which
citizens are able to insert their concerns and opinions on the local police department’s
performance, and to provide feedback if they are truly prioritizing issues that align with the
community’s.
Avenues of participation was measured on a 5-pt scale (0-4): 0 being no avenues for
participation, 1 being 1 avenue, 2 being 2, and so on. This translates to a score of 2 meaning
average quality avenues and a score of 4 being high quality avenues. The available avenues for
citizen participation were determined by assessing each police department’s official web page, as
well as local news articles posted about the department. Often, departments would have a page
dedicated to community outreach and engagement efforts, and those with proper avenues would
heavily advertise/promote their existence on the web page. This made it relatively simple to
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determine the total number and types of avenues for citizen participation. These avenues most
notably include citizen councils, advisory committees, public meetings and hearings, public
workshops, and citizen complaint review boards. The table below shows an exhaustive list of all
possible avenues for participation I found (6). If high quality avenues existed in a locality
(namely, citizen’s councils and public meetings/hearings whose primary purpose is to learn
about citizen’s priorities and take them into consideration), the score would increase by an
additional 1. Otherwise, the remaining avenues were weighted equally for lack of any
exceptional reason to increase/decrease their weights, as was the case for citizen’s councils and
public meetings/hearings.
Table 6. Overview of possible avenues for citizen participation, a dimension of bottom-up
governance.
Avenue
Score
Citizen councils
2 (high quality)
Public meetings/hearings
2 (high quality)
Advisory committees
1
Resident councils
1
Neighborhood meetings
1
Public workshops
1
Steering committees
1
Citizens’ academies
1
Commission boards
1
Citizen complaint review boards
1
Community outreach teams
1
Community liaisons
1
Coffee with a Cop programs
1
It is important to note that the mere existence of avenues for citizen participation does not
mean that these avenues are actually being used. This measure is only one dimension of the
bottom-up governance puzzle, working closely in conjunction with voter turnout, or likelihood of
citizen participation. Without active citizen engagement, the existence of avenues for citizen
participation is pointless; without avenues for citizen participation, any active citizen
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engagement cannot be effectively channeled towards creating substantive change in the local
police department’s priorities. Both these dimensions are crucial aspects of bottom-up
governance, and it is clear that one cannot be considered without the other.
Ease of Citizen Participation
Closely related to the aforementioned dimension of bottom-up governance, ease of
participation more precisely illuminates the barriers towards accessing and utilizing such
avenues for citizen participation. Ease of citizen participation is broken down into two
quantitative measures: internet access and language barriers to participation.
Internet Access
As previously mentioned, Sharp (1980) emphasizes the participatory attitude that the
term co-production conveys (and by extension, bottom-up governance). “Citizens of a
democratic society need access to information that enables them to evaluate the performance of
public officials” (McGinnis, 1999:22). With the “access to information” that the internet
provides, learning about opportunities to engage with avenues for citizen participation is much
simpler, news articles about local police-related events are quickly available for citizens, and
citizens are generally much more capable of staying informed about their local community. If
citizens lack the information on how to participate in local governance, it is much more difficult
for them to determine how to voice any opinions they do hold. If citizens lack the information on
what is actually happening in their locality, it is unlikely that they will feel invested in
participating in local self-determination about a topic they feel so unfamiliar with. Essentially, a
lack of internet access is a barrier to citizen participation. Moreover, “if citizens are uninformed
about what is happening in their community, their subjective perception of public safety may not
necessarily be related to actual public safety outcomes”, making access to information that much
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more important to take into consideration, especially in this study measuring citizen satisfaction
with local public safety (Ho and Cho, 2017).
Thus, the level of internet access within each locality was included in the measure of
bottom-up governance to estimate the relative ease by which citizens are able to stay informed
and connected to opportunities for citizen participation in the local police department. Data on
each locality’s internet access were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau, measured through
the percent of houses with a broadband internet subscription between 2015-2019.
Language Barrier to Participation
A language barrier works in conjunction with internet access to reduce the ease of citizen
participation in determining the local police department’s rules, priorities, and agenda. Those
who are less comfortable reading and speaking English will have greater difficulty with:
1. understanding how to access relevant information on the avenues of citizen
participations,
2. finding out what current events are occuring that are related to local policing,
3. comprehending any information they do learn about the local police department, and
4. determining how to effectively participate and voice their opinions on the local police
department in a language they are not completely comfortable with.
Therefore, the proportion of citizens who speak languages other than English at home was
included in the measure of bottom-up governance to estimate the relative ease of citizen
participation, as those who are primarily non-English speaking will likely have a more difficult
time actively participating and voicing their opinions on the local police department. I collected
these data from the U.S. Census Bureau, which measured the percent of people over the age of 5
who speak a language other than English at home between 2015-2019 in each locality.
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Logically, the proportion of citizens who speak English at home was calculated by subtracting
the non-English speaking percentage from 100:
% 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 100 − % 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔
This re-calculation was done for ease of considering the effect of increasing bottom-up
governance on satisfaction. An increase in the proportion of English-speaking individuals will
likely lead to more satisfaction, as these individuals are more able to voice their opinion and
“construct” a police department that represents their personal preferences.
Confounding Variables and Controls
As noted in the literature review, the study of the effect of demographic variables on
citizen satisfaction with the police, as well as citizen participation in politics, is well
documented. Therefore, it is important to control for these variables when assessing the specific
effect of bottom-up governance on satisfaction, so as to separate this effect from the factors that
themselves affect the ability to participate in bottom-up governance. To briefly elucidate these
relationships:
1. Age: Older age leads to increased likelihood of political participation. This indicates
increased bottom-up governance and, consequently, increased satisfaction.
Younger age will lead to decreased likelihood of political participation. This indicates
decreased bottom-up governance and, consequently, decreased satisfaction.
2. Gender: Males have higher rates of political participation. This indicates increased
bottom-up governance and, consequently, increased satisfaction.
Females have lower rates of political participation. This indicates decreased bottomup governance and, consequently, decreased satisfaction.
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3. Race: White people have higher rates of political participation. This indicates
increased bottom-up governance and, consequently, increased satisfaction.
Black people have lower rates of political participation. This indicates decreased
bottom-up governance and, consequently, decreased satisfaction.
4. Education: Higher levels of education are associated with increased rates of political
participation. This indicates increased bottom-up governance, and consequently,
increased satisfaction.
Lower levels of education are associated with decreased rates of political
participation. This indicates decreased bottom-up governance and, consequently,
decreased satisfaction.
5. Income: Higher income levels are associated with increased rates of political
participation. This indicates increased bottom-up governance and, consequently,
increased satisfaction.
Lower income levels are associated with decreased rates of political participation.
This indicates decreased bottom-up governance and, consequently, decreased
satisfaction.
6. Poverty: Higher levels of poverty are associated with decreased rates of political
participation. This indicates decreased bottom-up governance and, consequently,
decreased satisfaction.
Lower levels of poverty are associated with increased rates of political participation.
This indicated increased bottom-up governance and, consequently, increased
satisfaction.
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Additionally, in looking at police performance, Ostrom found that smaller police forces
that patrol smaller jurisdictions are just as effective at satisfying citizen’s demands as larger,
city-wide consolidated police departments with larger populations under its jurisdiction, if not
achieving higher levels of satisfaction (Ostrom and Whitaker, 1973). She determined that smaller
police forces are more likely to have officers that live in the community, are more aware of local
needs, and are more likely to have existing relationships with members of the community,
allowing for increased levels of communication. As population size may have an impact on
citizen satisfaction, it is important to also control for this variable when assessing the effect of
bottom-up governance on satisfaction.
These data on the general demographic information of each locality were collected from
the U.S. Census Bureau’s website (Table 7). For age, the percent of people under 18 years and
over 65 years old were recorded, estimated as of July 1, 2019. For gender, the percent of female
persons in the locality was recorded, estimated as of July 1, 2019. For race and origin, the
following percentages were recorded using estimates as of July 1, 2019: white alone, not
Hispanic or Latino; black or African American alone; Asian alone; and Hispanic or Latino. For
education, the percent of people, ages 25+, who have graduated high school or higher was
recorded, as well as those with a bachelor’s degree or higher, estimated between 2015-2019. For
income, the median household income (in 2019 dollars) was recorded, estimated between 20152019. For poverty, the percent of the population in poverty was recorded, estimated between
2015-2019. The “Census Bureau uses a set of money income thresholds that vary by family size
and composition to determine who is in poverty. If a family's total income is less than the
family's threshold, then that family and every individual in it is considered in poverty” (2021).
For population size, the 2019 population estimate was used for localities with a satisfaction

43

survey that took place between 2015-2020, and if the survey took place between 2010-2014, the
2010 population estimate was used to ensure consistency between the various measures.
Table 7. Demographic variables recorded for each locality in the study from U.S. Census
Bureau and summary statistics.
Variable
Breakdown
Mean
Std. Dev. Min
Max
Age
% 65+
21.9
4.33
12.8
33.6
% <18
13.5
3.33
6.4
22.7
Gender
% Female
51.0
1.32
46.8
54.7
Race
% White alone, not Hispanic or Latino 56.7
19.8
11.1
91.2
% Black or African American alone
15.8
15.4
0.5
59.5
% Asian alone
8.88
11.2
0.1
66.9
% Hispanic or Latino
15.5
12.3
2.1
45.0
Education % Highschool graduate or higher,
90.7
5.64
66.8
98.5
persons age 25+
% Bachelor’s degree or higher,
43.3
15.0
16.9
83.5
persons age 25+
Income
Median household income ($)
73,373 24,793
30,907 135,565
Poverty
% Population in poverty
13.0
7.1
0.5
32.7
Population Estimation of population size
324,684 485,503
8,006 2,693,976
To summarize, in addition to these seven confounding variables, I constructed two
variables to measure community satisfaction with the local police department and to measure
bottom-up governance, taking into consideration its four dimensions. For my Bottom-Up
Governance Model, I have chosen to weigh each of the four dimensions equally, as each
dimension is important in its own right and contributes significantly to the general outcome of
“bottom-up governance”:
𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 𝑢𝑝 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (0 − 10)
= 0.25 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 0.25 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡
+ 0.25 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑃 + 0.25 ∗ 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑃
I will proceed to use these variables to test my hypothesis on the relationship between bottom-up
governance and citizen satisfaction with the local police department.
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Part IV: Results
In the following section, I present the results of the Bottom-Up Governance model I have
constructed on predicting citizen satisfaction with local policing. The four dimensions of bottomup governance that I include in my model are: internal funding dependence, likelihood of citizen
participation, avenues for citizen participation, and ease of citizen participation. To test this
model, I ran an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on the dataset that I have constructed.
Including the relevant controls in my model will account for their influence on satisfaction,
ensuring that the outcome we see can truly be attributed to bottom-up governance. I expect to see
a positive relationship, where an increase in bottom-up governance leads to increased citizen
satisfaction with their local police department. The coefficient of the modeled relationship
should be positive and statistically significant. Additionally, to provide support for the robustness
of my Bottom-Up Governance model, I will create four supplementary models, changing the
relative weights of each dimension of bottom-up governance that I include. This will show that
the outcome I expect – that increased bottom-up governance leads to increased satisfaction with
local policing – is not contingent upon the model I originally chose to use.
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Data Visualization
To preface my data analysis, I first undertook a number of general data visualization
measures to become familiar with the dataset that I have constructed and to assess whether the
data follow a normal distribution.
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Figure 1. A histogram displaying the distribution of satisfaction scores from the 72 total
localities included in this study. The minimum satisfaction score was 1.4, the maximum score
was 2.91, the mean score was 2.2, and the standard deviation was 0.346.
Seen in Figure 1 above, the distribution of satisfaction scores is skewed slightly to the
left, but overall, it does generally follow a normal distribution. It is important to note that no
locality scored below a 1.4, despite the fact that the range of theoretical scores was between 0-3.
On the other hand, the highest score seen in this dataset (2.91) was only 0.09 points away from a
“perfect” satisfaction score of 3.
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Figure 2. A histogram displaying the distribution of bottom-up governance scores from the 72
total localities included in this study. The minimum bottom-up governance score was 2.73, the
maximum score was 9.35, the mean score was 5.93, and the standard deviation was 1.29.
Seen in Figure 2 above, the distribution of bottom-up governance scores is roughly
normal, with a small, uncharacteristic peak occurring towards the higher scores. Similarly to the
satisfaction scores, there is an overall upwards bias in bottom-up governance scores. The lowest
score was 2.73, despite the fact that the theoretical range of possible scores was 0-10. The
highest score was 9.35, only 0.65 points away from a “perfect” bottom-up governance score.
Seeing that both my independent and dependent variables roughly follow a normal distribution, I
feel comfortable using an OLS regression to test for the relationship, as the assumption of
normality is fulfilled by these variables.

47

-.4

-.2

Residuals
0
.2

.4

.6

Residual - Fitted Value Plot (RVF)

1.8

2

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

Fitted values

Figure 3. A residual-fitted value plot of bottom-up governance and citizen satisfaction with the
local police department. Each point represents an individual locality (n=72).
Another main assumption for using an OLS regression to model a given relationship is
the homogeneity of variance of the residuals. If the model is well-fitted to the variables, then no
pattern should exist. Figure 3 depicts no discernable pattern in the plotted residuals. Therefore, I
again feel justified in my use of an OLS regression to model the relationship between bottom-up
governance and satisfaction in my analysis.
Feeling confident in my decision to use an OLS regression, I next constructed a
scatterplot to visualize the general relationship between bottom-up governance and satisfaction
with the local police department.
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Figure 4. A scatterplot displaying the relationship between bottom-up governance and
satisfaction scores. A line of best fit and 95% confidence interval were included to highlight the
general trends between increased bottom-up governance and satisfaction. Each point represents a
different locality.
As seen above, there is a subtle but discernible positive trend in citizen satisfaction with
the police as bottom-up governance increases (Figure 4). The linear fit that is overlayed on the
figure indicates that a one unit increase in a locality’s bottom-up governance score leads to a
0.124 increase in the satisfaction score. Given the small scale used for my satisfaction variable
(0-3), a 0.124 increase in satisfaction is not trivial; this is roughly equivalent to a 4% increase in
satisfaction with every unit increase in the bottom-up governance score. Nevertheless, this
apparent relationship does not control for the confounding variables that I have taken into
consideration. Therefore, I cannot confidently attribute this increase in satisfaction to bottom-up
governance at this point.
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Linear Regression Analysis
Now, I present the core finding of my research: an ordinary least squares regression
model on my constructed bottom-up governance independent variable, the citizen satisfaction
dependent variable, and the seven controls I have chosen to include in this analysis. I expect to
find a positive relationship between bottom-up governance and satisfaction; the coefficient of the
modeled relationship should be positive and statistically significant.
Table 8. Regression analysis of the relationship between Bottom-Up Governance and
Satisfaction with Police Performance.
Variable
Model 1 (w/ controls)
Model 2 (no controls)
Independent Variable
Bottom-Up Governance
0.0647*
0.124***
(0.0295)
(0.0283)
Control Variables
Age
Age under 18
0.0271*
-(0.0113)
Age over 65
0.0134
-(0.0138)
Gender
-0.0636*
-(0.0301)
Race
Black alone
0.0853**
-(0.024)
Asian alone
0.0943**
-(0.0256)
Hispanic or Latino
0.0912***
-(0.0245)
White alone
0.089***
-(0.024)
Education
HS Graduate +
0.0244*
-(0.012)
BS Degree +
-0.0019
-(0.0044)
Income
-0.00000394
-(0.00000333)
Poverty
-0.00577
-(0.00999)
Population Size
-0.000000181*
-(0.0000000745)
Constant
-6.068
1.467
(2.996)
(0.172)
Note: *** p <.001, ** p < .01, * p <.05, n = 72
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Table 8 lays out the coefficients and standard deviations (in parentheses) for satisfaction,
the dependent variable, and all of my previously justified controls. I find the expected positive
relationship between bottom-up governance and satisfaction; more specifically, a one unit
increase in a locality’s bottom-up governance score leads to a 0.0647 increase of its satisfaction
score, after controlling for all other variables in the model (p = 0.032). The 95% confidence
interval for the model (0.0056, 0.124) does not cross zero. Therefore, using a 5% significance
level, I have evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a statistically significant impact of
bottom-up governance on the level of satisfaction citizens experience for their local police
departments.
Additional Testing
As previously stated, I weighed each of the four dimensions equally for my main BottomUp Governance model:
𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 𝑢𝑝 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (0 − 10)
= 0.25 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 0.25 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡
+ 0.25 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑃 + 0.25 ∗ 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑃
To provide further support for the robustness of my model, I have changed the relative weights
of each dimension of bottom-up governance that I chose to include. This will show that the
outcome I have found – that increased bottom-up governance leads to increased satisfaction with
local policing – is not contingent on the proportions I originally decided upon.
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Internal Funding Dependence
First, I have chosen to increase the relative weight of internal funding dependence in my model:
𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 𝑢𝑝 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
= 0.4 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 0.2 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡
+ 0.2 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑃 + 0.2 ∗ 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑃
Table 9. Regression analysis of the relationship between Bottom-Up Governance and
Satisfaction with Police Performance, heavily weighing internal funding dependence.
Variable
Model 1 (w/ controls)
Model 2 (no controls)
Independent Variable
Bottom-Up Governance
0.0526*
0.128***
(0.0303)
(0.0301)
Control Variables
Age
Age under 18
0.0261*
-(0.0115)
Age over 65
0.0124
-(0.014)
Gender
-0.0644*
-(0.0305)
Race
Black alone
0.0847**
-(0.0244)
Asian alone
0.0928**
-(0.0256)
Hispanic or Latino
0.0897**
-(0.0248)
White alone
0.0884**
-(0.0243)
Education
HS Graduate +
0.0257*
-(0.0122)
BS Degree +
-0.00247
-(0.00444)
Income
-0.0000033
-(0.00000335)
Poverty
-0.00593
-(0.0101)
Population Size
-0.000000163*
-(0.0000000745)
Constant
-6.013
1.37
(3.04)
(0.199)
Note: *** p <.001, ** p < .01, * p <.1, n = 72
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Table 9 lays out the coefficients and standard deviations for satisfaction and my
previously justified controls within this newly adjusted Bottom-Up Governance model. I find the
expected positive relationship between bottom-up governance and satisfaction; we see that a one
unit increase in a locality’s bottom-up governance score leads to a 0.0526 increase of its
satisfaction score, after controlling for all other variables in the model (p = 0.088). With the
adjusted model, the p-value increased by 0.056 (from 0.032). Nevertheless, using a 10%
significance level, I have evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a statistically significant
impact of bottom-up governance on the level of satisfaction citizens experience for their local
police departments.
Likelihood of Citizen Participation
Next, I increased the relative weight of likelihood of citizen participation in my model:
𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 𝑢𝑝 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
= 0.2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 0.4 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡
+ 0.2 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑃 + 0.2 ∗ 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑃
Table 10 shows the coefficients and standard deviations for satisfaction and my
previously justified controls within this adjusted Bottom-Up Governance model. Again, I find
the expected positive relationship between bottom-up governance and satisfaction; more
specifically, a one unit increase in a locality’s bottom-up governance score leads to a 0.0494
increase of its satisfaction score, after controlling for all other variables in the model (p = 0.096).
With the adjusted model, the p-value increased by 0.064 (from 0.032). Nevertheless, using a
10% significance level, I continue to have evidence supporting the hypothesis that there is a
statistically significant impact of bottom-up governance on citizen satisfaction with local police
departments.
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Table 10. Regression analysis of the relationship between Bottom-Up Governance and
Satisfaction with Police Performance, heavily weighing internal funding dependence.
Variable
Model 1 (w/ controls)
Model 2 (no controls)
Independent Variable
Bottom-Up Governance
0.0494*
0.101**
(0.0292)
(0.028)
Control Variables
Age
Age under 18
0.0282*
-(0.0115)
Age over 65
0.0127
-(0.0141)
Gender
-0.0627*
-(0.0306)
Race
Black alone
0.0877**
-(0.0245)
Asian alone
0.0972***
-(0.0262)
Hispanic or Latino
0.094***
-(0.0251)
White alone
0.0918***
-(0.0244)
Education
HS Graduate +
0.0266*
-(0.0121)
BS Degree +
-0.0016
-(0.0045)
Income
-0.0000044
-(0.00000345)
Poverty
-0.00662
-(0.0101)
Population Size
-0.000000177*
-(0.0000000761)
Constant
-6.44
1.67
(3.07)
(0.152)
Note: *** p <.001, ** p < .01, * p <.1, n = 72
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Avenues for Citizen Participation
Next, I increased the relative weight of avenues for citizen participation in my model:
𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 𝑢𝑝 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
= 0.2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 0.2 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡
+ 0.4 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑃 + 0.2 ∗ 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑃
Table 11. Regression analysis of the relationship between Bottom-Up Governance and
Satisfaction with Police Performance, heavily weighing avenues for citizen participation.
Variable
Model 1 (w/ controls)
Model 2 (no controls)
Independent Variable
Bottom-Up Governance
0.0648**
0.105***
(0.0223)
(0.0243)
Control Variables
Age
Age under 18
0.027*
-(0.011)
Age over 65
0.0142
-(0.0135)
Gender
-0.0663*
-(0.0292)
Race
Black alone
0.0818**
-(0.0233)
Asian alone
0.0904***
-(0.0249)
Hispanic or Latino
0.0874***
-(0.0237)
White alone
0.0857***
-(0.0233)
Education
HS Graduate +
0.0231*
-(0.0117)
BS Degree +
-0.00195
-(0.00426)
Income
-0.00000374
-(0.00000322)
Poverty
-0.00497
-(0.00972)
Population Size
-0.000000198*
-(0.0000000729)
Constant
-5.5
1.58
(2.91)
(0.148)
Note: *** p <.001, ** p < .01, * p <.1, n = 72
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From this (thrice) adjusted model for Bottom-Up Governance, I again find the expected
positive relationship between bottom-up governance and satisfaction (Table 11). A one unit
increase in bottom-up governance leads to a 0.0648 increase in satisfaction, after controlling for
all other variables in the model (p = 0.005). With the adjusted model, the p-value has decreased
by 0.027 (relative to 0.032). This is only case where the p-value of the supplementary model is
lower than the primary model’s p-value. Using a 5% significance level, I have strong evidence
supporting the hypothesis that there is a statistically significant impact of bottom-up governance
on citizen satisfaction with local police departments.
Ease of Citizen Participation
Finally, I increased the relative weight of ease of citizen participation in my model:
𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 𝑢𝑝 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
= 0.2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 0.2 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡
+ 0.2 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑃 + 0.4 ∗ 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑃
From this adjusted model for Bottom-Up Governance, I find the expected positive
relationship between bottom-up governance and satisfaction, meaning that all four
supplementary models agree with the results of my primary Bottom-Up Governance model
(Table 12). A one unit increase in a locality’s bottom-up governance score leads to a 0.0722
increase of its satisfaction score, after controlling for all other variables in the model (p = 0.053).
With the adjusted model, the p-value has increased by 0.021 (from 0.032). Using a 10%
significance level, I continue to have strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that there is a
statistically significant impact of bottom-up governance on citizen satisfaction with local police
departments.
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Table 12. Regression analysis of the relationship between Bottom-Up Governance and
Satisfaction with Police Performance, heavily weighing ease of citizen participation.
Variable
Model 1 (w/ controls)
Model 2 (no controls)
Independent Variable
Bottom-Up Governance
0.0722*
0.137***
(0.365)
(0.0291)
Control Variables
Age
Age under 18
0.0266*
-(0.0114)
Age over 65
0.0135
-(0.014)
Gender
-0.0625*
-(0.0304)
Race
Black alone
0.0854**
-(0.0242)
Asian alone
0.0953**
-(0.0258)
Hispanic or Latino
0.0916***
-(0.0247)
White alone
0.0893***
-(0.0241)
Education
HS Graduate +
0.0224*
-(0.0123)
BS Degree +
-0.00191
-(0.00443)
Income
-0.00000395
-(0.00000335)
Poverty
-0.00541
-(0.0101)
Population Size
-0.000000176*
-(0.0000000748)
Constant
-6.03
1.36
(3.02)
(0.181)
Note: *** p <.001, ** p < .01, * p <.1, n = 72
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Part V: Discussion
Bottom-Up Governance Model
My hypothesis tested whether increased bottom-up governance in localities is associated
with increased citizen satisfaction with local police departments. Using an OLS model to assess
this relationship, I regressed citizen satisfaction over my constructed bottom-up governance
measure. Additionally, to provide support for the robustness of my Bottom-Up Governance
model, I created four supplementary models with varying weights of each dimension of bottomup governance. I found that across all five models, an increase in the bottom-up governance
score of a locality leads to a statistically significant increase in citizen satisfaction with the local
police department. To clarify what this means, increased internal funding dependence, likelihood
of citizen participation (measured through local voter turnout), avenues for citizen participation,
and ease of citizen participation (measured by level of English speaking and internet access) will
lead to greater citizen satisfaction. Bottom-up governance is an independent contributor to the
level of citizen satisfaction achieved in a locality, even after controlling for important variables
like age, gender, race, socio-economic status, and population size that have previously been
established as indicators of satisfaction with policing (Weitzer and Tuch, 2005a:288; Ostrom and
Whitaker, 1974; Brown and Benedict, 2002:554; Ren et al., 2004; Boettke et al., 2016).
Two Case Studies
In order to more concretely depict the impact that bottom-up governance has on citizen
satisfaction with local police departments, I will briefly describe two localities that were included
in my study: Durham, NC and Andover, KS. I chose these two cases because they are clear
examples of the low bottom-up governance, low satisfaction model (Durham, NC), and the high
bottom-up governance, high satisfaction model (Andover, KS) that I predicted in my hypothesis.
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Durham, NC
In Durham, NC, I found one avenue of citizen participation associated with the police
department: a community engagement unit, nominally dedicated towards improving community
relations and acting as a pathway towards local engagement (Table 13). Partnered with the
relatively low levels of voter turnout that characterizes this community (14%), I predict within
my Bottom-Up Governance model that this one avenue is not being used to its full potential, as
Durham citizens are unlikely to be politically active and participate in affecting change within
the police department. Additionally, 6.75% of Durham’s annual police budget is derived from
external funding sources, and I argue that this dependence pulls the local police department’s
priorities away from what the community truly values and instead towards an externally
determined set of initiatives (Boettke et al. 2016). Lastly, the two measures that comprise the
“Ease of Citizen Participation” dimension of my Bottom-Up Governance model indicate
increased levels of non-English speakers in Durham, as well as slightly lower levels of internet
access within the community, when compared to Andover, KS. The effect of internet access does
not have as compelling an impact upon ease of citizen participation in this comparison, but the
proportion of non-English speakers in Durham, NC is nearly double that of Andover, KS, neatly
coalescing with my hypothesis that higher barriers towards participation will decrease the
occurrence of bottom-up governance within a community, leading to decreased citizen
satisfaction with the local police department.
Andover, KS
In Andover, KS, I found four avenues of citizen participation carried out by the police
department: a community alert system, National Night Out engagement events, a neighborhood
association program, and regularly programmed police/fire festivals (Table 13). To briefly
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describe these avenues, the community alert system is a mass notification program that sends out
information to all community members about emergencies and community engagement events;
National Night Out is an annual community-building event where community members and
police officers have the opportunity to establish and grow relationships, with a special focus on
promoting police-community partnerships; the neighborhood association program is a program
where each homeowner’s association within Andover has a specifically assigned police officer to
act as a liaison to address any concerns in the neighborhood and to relay them to the department
itself; and the Police/Fire Festival, which takes place three times a year, has consistently high
attendance rates, acts as another point of interaction between the community and local police
department, and further establishes/promotes relationship-building.
In conjunction with the relatively high rates of local voter turnout that characterizes this
community (37.6%), I predict within my Bottom-Up Governance model that these avenues of
participation are being actively used by Andover citizens, as they are more likely to be politically
active and will participate in shaping a police department that suits their needs. Additionally, 0%
of the Andover police budget is derived from external funding source, so the opinions and ideas
that citizens hold can truly be implemented without outside funding dictating the fundamental
rules, priorities, and methods used by the police department. Lastly, the two measures that
comprise the “Ease of Citizen Participation” dimension of my Bottom-Up Governance model
indicate lower levels of non-English speakers in Andover, as well as slightly higher levels of
internet access within the community, when compared to Durham, NC. As I’ve already
mentioned, the effect of internet access does not have as compelling an impact upon ease of
citizen participation in this comparison, but the proportion of non-English speakers in Andover,
KS is approximately half that of Durham, NC, supporting my hypothesis that lower barriers
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towards participation will increase the occurrence of bottom-up governance within a community,
leading to increased citizen satisfaction with the local police department.
Table 13. A comparison of findings from two specific localities in this study: Durham, NC
and Andover, KS.
Locality
Durham, NC
Andover, KS
Independent Variable
Avenues for CP (0-4)
1
4
Outside Funding Dependence (%)
6.75
0
Local Voter Turnout (%)
14.0
37.6
% Non-English
19.6
9.7
% Internet Access
86.8
88.4
Dependent Variable
Satisfaction Score
1.62
2.91
Limitations
It is important to recognize that there are a number of limitations with my study. As
previously stated, the quality of the police satisfaction surveys included in this study widely
varied and could not be controlled for. A number of localities hired outside research firms to
conduct methodologically-sound citizen surveys, while others simply posted survey links on the
police department’s website, making news and social media posts to encourage individuals to fill
out the survey; the majority of surveys included in this study lie somewhere in between these two
extremes. I did not think it was appropriate to exclude any data, simply based on my perception
of the quality of the survey, so I included all surveys that answered my specific satisfaction
question in hopes of preventing any potential bias in this regard. Although there is no way to
adjust for this bias, it is also important to recognize that there is likely an upward bias in the
localities that carry out these satisfaction surveys. Conducting citizen satisfaction surveys in
itself is a form of bottom-up governance, as citizens are able to signal to the police departments
what their preferences and opinions on the department’s performance is. More specifically, these
satisfaction surveys are an avenue for citizen participation and voicing their opinion. Therefore,

61

police departments with perceivably low performance are disincentivized from conducting these
surveys, making this data publicly available, and officially recognizing their poor performance. I
hypothesize that there are a number of localities that have low satisfaction with their police
department due to a lack of bottom-up governance, but we have no way of seeing where these
localities are if they do not provide an avenue for citizen feedback.
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Part VI: Conclusion
To round out my thesis, I begin with a story about my second reader, Professor Tony
Corrado, who worked at the Department of Justice his senior year of college in the now defunct
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Professor Corrado served as a grants administrator,
closing out federal grants to local police departments (interestingly enough, federal money for
riot gear was “all the rage” back then). I wholly believe that Professor Corrado had nothing but
altruistic intentions with his work in this administration; however, I have demonstrated with my
findings that such use of federal funding to shape the priorities of local departments may not be
as effective and beneficial as we once believed.
Overall, this research set out to examine how the level of bottom-up governance in a
locality can affect citizen satisfaction in the performance of their local police departments. Using
empirical methods, I tested and quantified the relationship between bottom-up governance and
satisfaction. From my analysis, I found that bottom-up governance increases the satisfaction
citizens have for their local police department. These findings are part of a marginalized, yet
established literature on the importance of “active participation” of citizens in improving the
quality of public goods and services produced (Ostrom, 1996:1079; McGinnis, 1999:7, Aligica et
al., 2019:122). In the terms of political economy, this interaction is referred to as co-production.
In my terms, I refer to this interaction as bottom-up governance, in hopes to emphasize the role
of citizens and to verbally counter the already strong influence of government in establishing
rules and priorities at the local level. The government does not need more encouragement in
shaping institutions, but the active role of citizens must continue to be emphasized if the desired
outcome of increased satisfaction will be achieved.
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As previously explained, much of the existing literature on police satisfaction heavily
focuses on demographic variables, the impact of the quality of specific interactions, and
performance-based management (Gorby, 2013; Moore and Braga, 2003). Gill et al. (2014) found
that increased collaboration between the police and local citizens “for the purpose of defining,
prioritizing, and/or solving problems” increases satisfaction, which is wholly compatible with the
findings of my research (Gill et al., 2014). However, this study only took into consideration one
grant (the COPS grant) and excluded all other sources of external funding from their analysis. As
supported by my findings, all outside monetary influence will direct local police efforts away
from the community and towards an externally determined set of policing priorities (Boettke et
al., 2016). Apart from the existing literature on co-production, my research is the first to use a
variable that considers four concrete aspects of bottom-up governance to predict the quality of
services produced, which include external funding dependence, avenues for citizen participation,
likelihood of participation, and ease of participation.
More broadly, I set out to examine the ways in which citizens can engage with local
governance and affect change. The protests against police brutality that motivated the topic of
my thesis, while extremely important in their own right, made me realize and question the
general pattern of inelasticity that characterizes local governance today. Why, despite all these
protests and repeats of similar, unjustifiable events, don’t we see widespread, substantive reform
in the methods of policing currently used? With my research, I have created a better
understanding of how bottom-up governance, or citizen participation, can contribute to increased
satisfaction with local policing. Moreover, these findings on bottom-up governance are
generalizable far beyond the police department and can be applied to the production of all public
goods and services. This is closely in line with assertions from the Ostroms’ school of political
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economy, arguing that democratic participation in producing local services will lead to more
satisfactory public goods that truly cater to the needs and desires of the community. Essentially,
these findings strongly incentivize a widespread transition towards increased bottom-up
governance and directly challenge the current norms of policing, suggesting that top-down
regulation and mass consolidation are contrary to achieving the production of quality goods and
services.
More specifically, I have determined a number of concrete, practical policy
recommendations that can be derived from this study:
1) Bring the power of rule-setting back to the people and decrease external funding. Outside
actors should not hold precedence in setting the priorities of a local police department;
citizens themselves should be given the space and opportunity to self-govern and create
policies that most accurately cater to their needs. External funding sources that may
interfere with self-governance include federal and state grants that subsidize paramilitary
equipment, incentivize the seizure of narcotics, or generally dictate the priorities of local
police departments that citizens might not agree with.
2) Create avenues for citizen participation in rule and agenda setting of local police
departments. What is noticeably neglected from the current discourse on police reform is
the idea of creating an institutional framework that will allow for continued, long term
citizen participation in determining what the police’s priorities should be. This goes
beyond creating surface level, politically motivated changes that only aim to pacify
agitated protestors during waves of intense activism. From my research, I found that the
highest quality avenues of participation include citizen advisory councils, public
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meetings and hearings, and citizen complaint review boards, so I heavily support the
implementation of these particular avenues.
3) Create an equitable plan that allows for diverse citizen participation in the agenda-setting
of local police departments. It is important to note that barriers towards participating in
political agenda-setting and feelings of alienation are disproportionately experienced by
black Americans and people of color. BIPOC face significantly higher rates of
disenfranchisement, lowering their ability to meaningfully participate in politics, they are
more likely to face a language barrier in participation, and they are more likely to feel
discouraged from participating in reforming an institution that inflicts disproportionate,
undue, and unjust harm on them, simply based on the color of their skin (Cao et al., 1996;
Apple and O’Brien, 1983; Homant et al., 1984; Koenig, 1980; Parks, 1984; Smith and
Hawkins, 1973; Ostrom and Whitaker, 1974; McGinnis, 1999:203). Avenues for
participation will more frequently be used by individuals with lower barriers and feelings
of alienation (namely, white Americans). To address this issue, I propose the use of
liaisons, who will work closely with marginalized communities, bridge this gap in
participation, and will personally advocate for the priorities and desires of the
communities they represent. In my research, liaisons were included as a potential avenue
for participation that increased citizen satisfaction. Lastly, information on how to use the
different avenues for participation must be made easily accessible for all members of the
community, including those who lack internet access and those who are not fluent in
English.
This proposal for bottom-up governance does not come without its fair share of caveats.
For one, the mere existence of avenues for citizen participation does not mean that these avenues
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will actually be used. This is only one dimension of the bottom-up governance puzzle and must
work closely in conjunction with active citizen participation. Without active citizen engagement,
the existence of avenues for citizen participation is pointless, and without avenues for citizen
participation, any active citizen engagement that does exist cannot be effectively channeled
towards creating substantive change in the local institution’s priorities. All these dimensions are
crucial aspects of bottom-up governance, so one cannot be considered without the others. Active
citizen engagement is the key to a (minimally) functioning, if not happy, democracy, and
reaching this must be the first goal if there will be any hope towards achieving bottom-up
governance and the creation of a satisfactory institution that truly reflects the desires of the
people.
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